The progress of the Brexit and Trump agendas and the ebb and flow of Marine Le Pen’s fortunes in France’s presidential campaign have repeatedly brought to mind a novel I read last summer — The Opposing Shore, by Julien Gracq.
Gracq, who passed away in 2007 at the age of 97, is not well known in the English-speaking world but is highly regarded in his native France. The Opposing Shore is his most famous work. He was awarded the Prix Goncourt for it, but declined the prize. The Prix Goncourt, we are told, is the most prestigious French literary prize. (For the benefit of potential Gracq readers, I will say that, notwithstanding its elevated status, The Opposing Shore is not my favourite so far of the novels of his I have read. While worthwhile overall, I found the most valuable aspects concentrated at various spots in the book. Much of the rest demanded levels of perseverance on my part bordering on the superhuman, notwithstanding the strength of the plot and dialogue. Luckily, the last forty pages are very good.)
Gracq’s theme in The Opposing Shore was timely when published in 1951, after 37 years of European mayhem, and is timely again: the dynamism of life and of history cannot lie dormant or be subdued forever, no matter how convenient, safe, orderly, well planned, prosperous, intellectually justified, or pleasurably distracting the dormancy may be. Societies that seek dormancy are like dry tinder or a reaction waiting to happen, looking for a catalyst. As a character in the novel puts it, “a moment comes when what’s been fastened together longs to come apart.” Beneath the quiet, there is a build-up of disequilibrium. Individual catalysts, such as the novel’s protagonist, are drawn, in some cases just by a vague urge, to the flash point — i.e., the place where the normal course of events has been most suppressed and where individual actions, even without conscious intention, can have large, destabilizing and irreversible effects. The tinder and the spark have been brought together. The delicate status quo cannot be sustained.
When ignition occurs, when the situation is finally disturbed, society does not return to its previous, comforting state of rest but moves away abruptly. A series of events is triggered that proceeds almost mechanically. Even though the connection between each of the steps is not one of logical necessity, there is a sense that, once the first step is taken, a path has been predetermined. Each step makes the next more probable due to changes in perceptions, opportunities and incentives and, now that the inevitable has finally happened, to a surge of relief, a new vitality of a sort and perhaps ambition, notwithstanding the great risks posed by the new environment. Something, for better or worse, has been awakened. Things that were considered unthinkable a short time ago are now expected, unavoidable or, at the very least, eminently possible.
And so we see in our current world, with each step towards greater decentralization/sovereignty/populism (such as Brexit, the Trump election, the Trump inauguration speech, the Trump executive orders), each next step (such as Le Pen/Frexit, successful negotiation of Brexit, and, more speculatively, Calexit or Catalonian secession) appears to become more likely and energized, even though from a narrow institutional or mechanical perspective, they are notionally independent.
Is this “Gracq effect” simply a perception or is it real? If it is real, what are the mechanisms by which it might operate? I have set out a few possibilities below. All are forms of path dependence. Path dependence is the process by which past events create a predisposition to particular future events through their effect on the assessments made by individuals of the costs and benefits, and thus desirability, of future actions open to them.
First, these movements were initially given very little chance of success because of what was assumed to be the unassailable position of establishment ideology and control of important institutions. Their unexpected success thus moved similar and as yet unresolved initiatives from the set of impossible outcomes to the set of possible outcomes. These revised expectations cause individuals to modify their behaviour in ways that can make the future success of such movements more likely, as discussed below.
Second, a previous victory is likely to have a positive effect on the morale and the expectations of individuals supporting similar undertakings elsewhere. This in turn increases the incentive for these individuals to devote effort to political participation, advocacy, voting, etc.
Third, political techniques used successfully by other populist movements can be adopted or modified to suit local circumstances. Reliance on social networks to circumvent establishment media would be an example of this.
Fourth, successful movements may use their new political power to undermine international power bases of their ideological enemies or to assist or legitimate natural allies abroad. For example, statements by President Trump suggesting openness to a timely US-UK trade deal may help to undermine remaining opposition to the implementation of Brexit or the bargaining positions of those in the EU who seek terms for Brexit that discourage exit by others.
Fifth, parties whose interests are likely to be harmed by these movements will be more likely to take steps to protect themselves or hedge against that possibility as the success of the movements becomes more likely. Such steps can further increase the probability of populist success and could inadvertently assist their agenda in a mechanical, non-political sense.
For example, actions in the financial markets such as a selloff in sovereign debt, with a consequent increase in borrowing costs, may reinforce or appear to legitimate populist narratives regarding the threat posed by international financial markets to sovereignty. Changes in market price signals, such as bond spreads, also convey changes in consensus or “expert” views which can then lead to other types of protective or hedging decisions, such as relocation decisions. These actions reduce the costs to these individuals of populist success and may, as a result, reduce the extent of opposition.
Efforts by the bureaucracy or establishment media to mitigate or counteract what they view as the negative effects of populism emphasize not only their power but also what their opponents may view as a sense of entitlement to that power and are likely to be seen by the populists’ natural constituency as evidence that these institutions are prepared to act in a manner contrary to its perceived interests. (Whether interests diverge in fact as well as in perception is a separate question). All this, again, “confirms” the populist narrative and reinforces the notion of the populist leader as “champion”. Attempts at containment can signal the extent of disequilibrium in society and thus prompt action by others.
Other actions may bring about substantial change even in the absence of complete political victory. For example, it has been noted that a victory by Marine Le Pen, even without a legislative majority for the National Front, might prompt capital flight sufficient to bring about euro exit/re-denomination as an emergency response, rather than a policy choice. Suggestions that NATO may have its US funding reduced or otherwise be reformed may cause EU nations to increase defence spending and explore extra-NATO military cooperation with the UK or other EU nations. Such measures are likely to reduce the negative impact on those countries of changes to NATO and thus make such changes more likely. In addition, such EU-centred measures may represent, on their own, a form of de facto NATO reform. A final example is that the success of an anti-globalist or sovereignty movement at, say, the national level, may give new life to decentralization movements within its own borders as a response by those with different political preferences (e.g., Calexit as a response to Trump).
Novels are not the real world, but the above all seem to be pretty plausible examples of path dependence. While it is impossible to confidently predict the speed and exact pattern of change, the pressures for change in the West are likely to be persistently decentralizing and may drive us well away from our recent state of rest.
24 February 2017.